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This study investigates the effect of managerial sentiment on corporate disclosure decisions. Using 
terrorist attacks in the United States as adverse shocks to managerial sentiment, we find that firms 
located in the metropolitan areas attacked issue more negatively biased earnings forecasts. The 
effect is stronger for firms with higher operating uncertainty and firms with younger, 
inexperienced, or less confident executives and it is weaker for firms located in states with 
increasing violent crime rates. A potential alternative explanation is that managers could 
strategically bias earnings forecasts downward and attribute the poor performance to terrorist 
attacks. To address this issue, we conduct a battery of additional analyses and the results are more 
consistent with managerial sentiment than strategic attribution. In addition, we show that our 
results are unlikely driven by any economic effects of terrorist attacks. Finally, firms in the 
attacked areas also exhibit a more pessimistic tone in 10-K/10-Q filings. 
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This study investigates the impact of managerial sentiment on corporate disclosure decisions. 
Traditional disclosure theory suggests that managers are rational, in that they choose optimal 
disclosure strategies by weighing the benefits and costs of disclosure to maximize firm value or 
personal gain (e.g., Wagenhofer 1990; Verrecchia 2001). However, a growing literature shows 
that managerial personal traits, experiences, and emotions have nontrivial effects on various 
corporate decisions (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2011; Bernile, 
Bhagwat, and Rau 2017). A few recent studies have examined the impact of the individual 
attributes of executives, such as demographic characteristics, personal backgrounds, and 
experiences, in determining corporate disclosure activities (e.g., Bamber, Jiang, and Wang 2010; 
Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang 2011; Davis, Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang 2015). We extend this 
bourgeoning line of disclosure research by focusing on the impact of managerial sentiment, 
defined as misbeliefs held by managers that cannot be justified by available information (Baker 
and Wurgler 2006). 
The major challenge in analyzing the effect of managerial sentiment is the lack of an 
appropriate empirical measure, which could partially explain the slow development of this line of 
research. In this study, we use terrorist attacks and mass shootings (hereafter terrorist attacks), as 
exogenous forces that induce changes in managerial sentiment (e.g., Antoniou, Kumar, and 
Maligkris 2017, 2018). An advantage of using terrorist attacks is that they are generally unexpected 
and not correlated with firm performance but can have a nonnegligible impact on managerial 
emotions and feelings (e.g., Galea et al. 2002). Terrorist attacks generate negative sentiment 





coerce or intimidate governments or societies.”1 Prior psychology research suggests that people 
who experience fear, such as those who are exposed to terrorist attacks, exhibit more pessimistic 
sentiment and overestimate risk assessments (e.g., Lerner and Keltner 2001; Lerner, Gonzalez, 
Small, and Fischhoff 2003). Managers, as individuals, are subject to the same cognitive bias. This 
bias is likely to play a substantial role in disclosure decisions because these decisions often 
represent a forward-looking process involving significant estimation and judgment with little 
guidance and external monitoring. Moreover, the decisions normally lack arbitrage mechanisms 
and thus the impact of individual sentiment is possibly amplified. 
We identify managers who are most likely influenced by terrorist attacks by using the distance 
between the location of firm headquarters and the locations of attacks. The psychology literature 
suggests that people located closer to attack locations are affected more by the attacks (e.g., Galea 
et al. 2002), since they have a greater chance of direct exposure to such negative events and 
interactions with people who are directly affected. Therefore, we conjecture that managers of firms 
with headquarters located closer to terrorist attacks (hereafter affected firms) are more likely to 
experience negative sentiment shocks. We compare affected managers with control managers, that 
is, managers who work for firms that are far away, to estimate the effect of managerial sentiment 
on firm disclosure decisions.2 
Using a generalized difference-in-differences analysis (DiD), we find that, after terrorist 
attacks, affected firms issue more pessimistic earnings guidance compared to control firms far 
from the attacks. The impact of attacks on forecast bias is stronger when the number of fatalities 
                                                           
1 See https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_69482.htm.  
2 Corporate managers generally have large commercial and social networks and thus managers of firms located far 
away (i.e., control managers) could have exposure to the attacks via these networks. Moreover, some attacks, such as 
9/11, likely have a large effect that transcends geographic distance. These measurement issues likely bias our results 





increases, consistent with the conjecture that greater levels of fear lead to more pessimistic 
sentiment and lower expectations of future performance. In addition, the effect of terrorist attacks 
on pessimistic management forecast bias is more pronounced for firms with greater operating 
uncertainty and firms with younger or less experienced executives. The effect is weaker for firms 
with overconfident executives and firms located in states with increasing violent crime rates. In 
the dynamic analysis, we find no difference in management forecast bias between affected and 
control firms in the quarters prior to the attacks. Moreover, the effect of terrorist attacks on 
disclosure disappears after two quarters subsequent to the attacks, suggesting that the negative 
shock to managerial sentiment is short-lived (Antoniou et al. 2017, 2018). In additional analyses, 
we find that negative managerial sentiment also shortens forecast horizons, indicating an appraisal 
of uncertainty and plans for precautionary measures (Slovic 1987; Lerner et al. 2003). Finally, we 
find that the tone in subsequent 10-K/10-Q filings is more negative after terrorist attacks, 
suggesting that the impact of managerial sentiment on disclosure is generalizable to mandatory 
filings. 
There are at least two potential alternative explanations for our main results. First, managers 
could intentionally bias earnings forecasts downward and strategically attribute the poor 
performance to terrorist attacks. For example, after the 9/11 attacks, many companies issued profit 
warnings and blamed the terrorists for their disappointing performance (e.g., Knight 2001). Second, 
terrorist attacks can cause real economic losses and managers simply issue lower earnings 
guidance to communicate this rational expectation with the market. Arguably, our cross-sectional 
results can lend some support to the managerial sentiment explanation, given that they are largely 
motivated by and consistent with psychology theories. However, some cross-sectional variables 





effects (e.g., operating uncertainty). To address the challenge of alternative explanations, we 
conduct a battery of additional analyses and the results appear to favor the managerial sentiment 
interpretation. 
Regarding strategic attribution, we show that our results continue to hold after controlling for 
a proxy of managerial strategic behavior. They are also robust in an alternative DiD analysis, in 
which the treated and control firms likely have similar chances of engaging in strategic attribution. 
In addition, we observe a reduction in insider purchases immediately after the issuance of 
pessimistic forecasts, which, according to prior research, is less likely if managers act strategically 
(e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006). Finally, we find no evidence that the impact of terrorist attacks on 
forecast bias varies systematically with ex ante incentives to engage in strategic disclosure. 
For the economic effects interpretation, we argue that terrorist attacks should have no effect 
on forecast bias, even if they affect the level of forecasted earnings. This is because both expected 
earnings and actual earnings will be similarly affected by the attacks if managers make their 
forecast decisions rationally. Nonetheless, we conduct the following analyses. First, we show that, 
on average, terrorist attacks do not affect the subsequent sales growth and earnings performance 
of our sample firms. Second, our results are robust to the exclusion of the 9/11 attacks and to the 
exclusion of industries that are likely affected by terrorist attacks. Third, our results continue to 
hold when we consider only attacks with noncommercial targets (e.g., the U.S. Capitol and 
churches). Last, we find no evidence that the impact of terrorist attacks on disclosure is stronger 
for domestic firms, whose actual performance is more likely to be affected by the attacks. 
Our study contributes to the literature on financial reporting and disclosure. Traditional studies 
on corporate reporting and disclosure examine the role of managerial incentives and the trade-offs 





2008; Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010). A growing body of research examines how factors 
other than rational economic determinants affect corporate reporting and disclosure decisions. The 
seminal paper by Bamber et al. (2010) discovers significant manager-specific effects on corporate 
disclosure. The authors also show that managerial career tracks, educational background, and 
military experience affect disclosure characteristics. Schrand and Zechman (2012) and Hribar and 
Yang (2016) examine the impact of managerial overconfidence on financial reporting and 
voluntary disclosure, respectively. While these studies generally examine long-lived managerial 
characteristics (e.g., career and education) or psychological biases (e.g., overconfidence), we focus 
on a short-lived and time-varying psychological bias: managerial sentiment. 
Our study is closely related to the research of Brown, Christensen, Elliott, and Mergenthaler 
(2012) and Hribar, Melessa, Small, and Wilde (2017), who examine the effect of managerial 
sentiment on pro forma earnings disclosure and accrual estimation, respectively.3 However, our 
study differs from theirs in several important aspects. First, both Brown et al. (2012) and Hribar et 
al. (2017) derive their measure of managerial sentiment from the survey data of managers’ 
optimism about their firms’ future prospects. In contrast, we use the natural experiment setting of 
terrorist attacks to generate variations in managerial sentiment. Arguably, our method suffers less 
from endogeneity problems. Second, both Brown et al. (2012) and Hribar et al. (2017)  focus on 
the disclosure of actual earnings performance, whereas we examine management earnings forecast, 
which involves more uncertainty and thus is a more powerful setting for investigating the effect of 
                                                           
3 Brown et al. (2012) examine the effect of investor sentiment on pro-forma earnings disclosure. In an additional 
analysis, they examine whether the relation between investor sentiment and pro-forma earnings disclosure is driven 





managerial sentiment. Finally, while Hribar et al. (2017) and Brown et al. (2012) examine either 
mandatory or voluntary disclosure, our study examines both.4 
Our study is also related to the broad literature on managerial attributes and corporate policies. 
Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper echelon theory states that the individual characteristics of 
managers matter in corporate policies. Their study has spurred much empirical work on how 
managers’ styles and characteristics affect various firm policies, including firm financing, tax 
planning, and financial reporting decisions (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Bamber et al. 2010; 
Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010; Ge et al. 2011; Davidson, Dey, and Smith 2013). We add to 
this literature by providing evidence that managerial sentiment, which is a time-varying behavioral 
factor rather than an individual attribute, also matters in forming firm disclosure practices. 
Finally, we contribute to the behavioral finance literature on sentiment. Most prior studies on 
sentiment focus on aggregated investor sentiment (e.g., Brown and Cliff 2005; Baker and Wurgler 
2006; Lemmon and Portniaguina 2006; Bergman and Roychowdhury 2008; Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy 2012) and its influence on pricing efficiency, firm investment and strategic 
disclosure, and analyst forecasts. We add to the literature by studying the effects of individual-
level managerial sentiment on corporate decisions (e.g., Antoniou et al. 2017, 2018). 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Keynes (1936) was the first to propose the concept of sentiment, which he terms animal spirits. 
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) provide theoretical predictions of possible 
deviations of asset prices due to the sentiment of noise traders. Subsequent studies have provided 
empirical evidence on the relation between investor sentiment and equity market price dynamics, 
                                                           






suggesting sentiment-driven mispricing (Brown and Cliff 2005; Baker and Wurgler 2006; 
Lemmon and Portniaguina 2006). Recent studies extend their investigation to whether and how 
corporate decisions and other market participants could be influenced by investor sentiment and 
find that investor sentiment has an impact on corporate investment (e.g., Arif and Lee 2014; 
McLean and Zhao 2014), voluntary disclosure (Bergman and Roychowdhury 2008; Brown et al. 
2012), and analyst forecasts (Hribar and McInnis 2012). 
This study focuses on managerial sentiment and explores its potential effect on corporate 
disclosure decisions. Specifically, we examine how managerial sentiment affects management 
earnings forecasts. We focus on management forecasts because they are a major source of 
accounting-based information to the equity market (e.g., Beyer et al. 2010). More importantly, the 
information collection and interpretation process of producing management forecasts involves a 
great deal of uncertainty, which leaves room for managerial sentiment to come into play. Forecast 
activities are also subject to fewer mandatory regulations and involve a great deal of forward-
looking estimation compared to mandatory disclosure. Thus, managerial sentiment is more likely 
to exert a significant effect in the context of voluntary disclosure. 
Cognitive psychology argues that the presence of emotions can bias expectations. For example, 
people experiencing negative emotional shocks tend to overweight the possibility of unrelated 
negative outcomes (e.g., Lerner and Keltner 2001; Lerner et al. 2003). Pyszczynski, Holt, and 
Greenberg (1987) investigate the relation between depression and individuals’ expectations of 
future life events and find that depressed individuals are generally more pessimistic than 
nondepressed individuals are. Managers, as individuals, suffer emotional biases that could 
potentially undermine their estimation and judgment as well. Antoniou et al. (2017) examine 





managers tend to adopt more conservative policies by holding more cash, cutting research and 
development (R&D) expenses, and lowering leverage. We follow the approach of Antoniou et al. 
(2017) to exploit terrorist attacks as exogenous negative shocks to individual sentiment. 
Psychology literature shows that the reported symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
especially depression, are significantly higher among the individuals living close to the areas of 
attacks (e.g., Galea et al. 2002; Schlenger et al. 2002). We conjecture that, when managers are 
exposed to extreme negative events, that is, when their firms are located in the same areas as 
terrorist attacks, they are more likely to experience post-attack depression and are more likely to 
harbor more pessimistic feelings. Pessimistic feelings, in turn, make managers issue more 
negatively biased forecasts after terrorist attacks. 
The psychology literature also suggests that people experienced anger along with fear after the 
9/11 attacks (e.g., Lerner et al. 2003). In contrast to fear, anger is associated with an 
underestimation of risk (e.g., Lerner and Keltner 2001; Lerner et al. 2003) and may lead to more 
optimistic judgement after attacks. Back, Küfner, and Egloff (2010) find an increase of anger over 
an 18-hour window immediately after the 9/11 attacks. However, using a nationally representative 
sample, Stein et al. (2004) find that, two to three months after the 9/11 attacks, only 4% of the 
respondents reported that they felt irritable or had angry outbursts, whereas emotional upset is the 
dominant psychological reaction. This result is consistent with the psychology literature, in that 
PTSD and depression are the two most commonly observed psychological sequelae of trauma and 
disasters (Galea et al. 2002). Furthermore, the finance literature suggests that the net effects of 
terrorism on investors, managers, and other equity market participants are more consistent with 
fear rather than anger. For example, Wang and Young (2020) investigate how the mutual fund 





from equity funds to government bond funds. Antoniou et al. (2017, 2018) document that managers 
located close to attacks choose more conservative corporate policies and analysts located near 
attacks issue more pessimistic earnings forecasts. Therefore, we expect that depression rather than 
anger has a stronger influence on managers and we state our main hypothesis as follows. 
H1: Management forecasts issued by affected firms are more pessimistic compared to forecasts 
issued by control firms after terrorist attacks. 
We next develop several auxiliary hypotheses regarding the cross-sectional variations in the 
impact of terrorist attacks. First, we expect that the effect of managerial sentiment varies with the 
degree of uncertainty. The greater the uncertainty, the more judgment is needed in the forecasting 
process and thus a stronger effect of managerial sentiment is expected. 
H2a: The impact of terrorist attacks on management forecasts is stronger for firms with high 
uncertainty. 
Second, psychology studies show that younger individuals are less effective at regulating their 
emotions and thus tend to exhibit stronger emotional reactions (e.g., Scheibe and Blanchard-Fields 
2009). Younger people also experience more negative emotions, on average, than older people 
(Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, and Nesselroade 2000). In addition, people with less work 
experience are more likely to be influenced by behavioral biases (e.g., List 2003; Dhar and Zhu 
2006). If terrorist attacks affect management forecasts by imposing negative sentiment shocks on 
managers, we hypothesize that younger and less experienced executives are affected more. 
H2b: The impact of terrorist attacks on management forecasts is stronger for firms with younger 





Third, prior literature finds that overconfident executives are generally more optimistic (e.g., 
Malmendier and Tate 2005; Hribar and Yang 2016). To the extent that overconfident executives 
are less likely to be influenced by negative sentiment, we expect the effect of terrorist attacks on 
forecast pessimism to be less pronounced for overconfident executives. We thus propose the 
following hypothesis. 
H2c: The impact of terrorist attacks on management forecasts is weaker for firms with more 
confident executives. 
Lastly, people exhibit stronger emotional reactions when they experience highly unexpected 
negative events and they tend to be desensitized to repeated violence (e.g., Wilson, Centerbar, 
Kermer, and Gilbert 2005; Krahé et al. 2011). Thus, we conjecture that the impact of terrorist 
attacks on individuals’ emotions is less pronounced when the attacks occur in states with 
increasing rates of violent crime. 
H2d: The impact of terrorist attacks on management forecasts is weaker for firms located in states 
with increasing rates of violent crime. 
III. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data and Sample 
We obtain data on terrorist attacks and mass shootings in the United States from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) 5  and The Washington Post. 6  These two data sources contain 
information on all terrorist attacks and mass shootings and we extract the date, location, and 
                                                           
5 See http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. We extract all attacks that are clearly classified as terrorist attacks. For attacks to 
be classified as terrorist attacks and differentiable from normal crimes, they need to satisfy certain major criteria. As 
defined by the GTD, “the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of 
economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more 
profound, systematic economic change.” For details, see the GTD website. 





number of fatalities for each attack. To focus on important attacks and enhance the power of our 
tests, we use only attacks with at least one civilian death. In addition, we remove six cases that are 
more appropriately classified as murders. We also drop the attack if it is preceded by another attack 
in the same metropolitan area in the previous month, since these should be considered 
accompanying attacks. These filtering requirements yield 37 terrorist attacks from 1995 to 2015. 
We use the geographical distance between a firm’s historical headquarters and the locations of 
these terrorist attacks to capture the degree of negative shock on managerial sentiment. Specifically, 
we classify a firm as affected if it is located in the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as a 
terrorist attack. The definition of an MSA is obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau7 and we match 
each firm to an MSA using the firm’s headquarters’ business zip code.8 
Management earnings forecasts are obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(IBES) and firm-level controls are constructed using Compustat, Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP), IBES, and Thomson Reuters 13F data. Our sample starts with the IBES guidance 
database, including both annual and quarterly earnings per share forecasts to compute management 
forecast variables in each quarter. We exclude all the forecasts that are issued after the 
corresponding fiscal period end to eliminate earnings pre-announcements and firm-quarters with 
stock prices below $5 to avoid small denominator problem in estimating forecast bias. After 
requiring non-missing data for control variables, we are left with a final sample of 45,944 firm–
quarter observations. 
 3.2 Empirical design 
                                                           
7 See http://www.census.gov/population/metro/data/def.html.  
8  We obtain firm headquarters information from Professor Bill McDonald’s website at 
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/10-K_Headers/10-K_Headers.html. The matching between zip codes and MSAs is 






To examine whether managerial sentiment affects management forecast biases (H1), we 
employ a DiD approach. Specifically, we add a terrorist attack variable to the standard voluntary 
disclosure regression: 
𝑀𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 , = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 , + 𝛾 𝑋 , + 𝑓 + µ + 𝜀 , ,                         (1) 
for firm i, metropolitan area s, quarter q, and year t. The dependent variable, MFBias, is 
management forecast bias, computed as the difference between the management earnings forecast 
(point estimates or mid-point of range estimates) and actual earnings per share, deflated by the 
quarter-end stock price and averaged over each quarter.9  
The variable Attack captures whether a firm is located in an MSA where a terrorist attack 
occurred, measured as either the occurrence of attacks (Attack_Dummy) or the number of civilian 
fatality (Attack_#Death). The variable Attack_Dummy equals one for firms located in the same 
MSA as the attack for the two fiscal quarters following the terrorist attacks and zero otherwise. 
The variable Attack_#Death is defined as the logged value of one plus the number of civilian 
deaths for the two fiscal quarters following the attacks and zero otherwise. We define the two post-
attack fiscal quarters as those with a quarter-end falling in the first six months following terrorist 
attacks. We focus on the effect of attacks only in the first two quarters after the attacks because 
psychology studies show that post-disaster psychiatric symptoms can last for as long as six months 
and psychological resilience was observed six months after the 9/11 attacks (Mathewson 2004; 
Bonanno, Galea, Bucciarelli, and Vlahov 2006). 
The panel regression includes firm and year fixed effects, 𝑓  and µ , respectively, and thus 
represents a generalized DiD design that allows us to draw a causal inference (Bertrand and 
                                                           
9 Ciconte, Kirk, and Tucker (2014) find that actual earnings per share are closer to the upper end of range forecasts. 





Mullainathan 2003; Angrist and Pischke 2009). The coefficient 𝛽  in Eq. (1) captures any change 
in management forecast bias after terrorist attacks for affected firms relative to control firms. As 
predicted by H1, if managers become more pessimistic after terrorist attacks and are more likely 
to issue forecasts that fall short of actual earnings, we expect a negative coefficient estimate of 𝛽 . 
The vector X represents the set of control variables. We control for a firm’s information 
environment by including firm size (Size), analyst following (AnalystCov), and institutional 
holdings (InstHold). We include return on assets (ROA) to control for firm fundamentals and return 
volatility (SD_Ret) to control for the difficulty in forecasting future earnings. We also include 
market-to-book ratio (MTB) and financial leverage (Leverage) as additional control variables. Firm 
and year fixed effects 𝑓  and µ , respectively, are included to control for unobservable firm-level 
characteristics and economy-wide factors that could affect corporate disclosure decisions. In all 
the regressions, we cluster standard errors at the MSA level. Appendix A provides detailed 
definitions for all the variables used in our analysis. 
Hypothesis H2 explores cross-sectional effects of managerial sentiment on voluntary 
disclosure due to firm uncertainty, executive individual attributes, and past exposures to violence. 
We test this set of hypotheses by modifying Eq. (1) as follows: 
𝑀𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 , = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 , + 𝛽 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 , ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟 ,  + 𝛽 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟 ,  
+𝛾 𝑋 , + 𝑓 + µ + 𝜀 , ,        (2) 
where Char is a dummy variable representing firm uncertainty, executive age, executive 
experience, executive overconfidence, and the change in the state crime rate, respectively. We 
measure firm uncertainty using cash flow volatility and analyst forecast dispersion. We construct 





and analyst forecast dispersion (AF_Dispersion) into terciles and assigning a value of one to 
SD_CF_D/AF_Dispersion_D if cash flow volatility or analyst forecast dispersion falls in the 
highest tercile and zero otherwise.10 If higher firm uncertainty indeed triggers more pessimistic 
expectations about the future after attacks, we expect 𝛽  to be significantly negative for H2a. 
To test H2b and H2c, we measure executive attributes by focusing on CEOs and CFOs as prior 
literature suggests that both CEOs and CFOs exert significant influence over management forecast 
decisions.11 For H2b, we rank the average of CEO age and CFO age into terciles and assign a value 
of one to the dummy variable Age_D if the average age is in the highest tercile and zero otherwise. 
We use the tenure (the number of years in office) to proxy for executive experience and rank the 
average of CEO tenure and CFO tenure into terciles and assign a value of one to the dummy 
variable Tenure_D if the average tenure is in the highest tercile and zero otherwise. We expect a 
mitigating effect of age and experience, that is, a positive 𝛽 . 
Following prior literature, we measure executive overconfidence by the duration of the CEO’s 
and CFO’s stock options holdings. If either CEO or CFO is classified as a long holder of stock 
options, we assign a value of one to the variable Overconfidence and zero otherwise. A CEO/CFO 
is considered a long holder if the CEO/CFO ever holds a stock option that is at least 40% in the 
money at least until the last year (e.g., Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008; Malmendier et al. 2011). 
If executive overconfidence can reduce the impact of negative sentiment shock, we expect 𝛽  to 
be positive for H2c. 
                                                           
10 In untabulated robustness checks, we use quintile rankings to construct the conditioning variables and the results 
are generally robust (with the exception of the age test, which has predicted but insignificant signs for the interaction 
terms).  





Finally, we use the average change of the state crime rate (∆Crime_Rate) over the past five 
years, as a proxy for pre-attack exposure to negative events (Antoniou et al. 2018).12 We rank the 
change of the state crime rate into terciles and assign the dummy variable ∆Crime_Rate_D a value 
of one for the highest group and zero otherwise. If prior exposure to increasing violent crimes 
mitigates individuals’ reaction to terrorist attacks, we expect 𝛽  to be positive (H2d). 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Appendix B lists all the attacks in our sample. The first one is the 1995 Federal Building 
bombing in Oklahoma City and the last one is the 2015 Inland Regional Center attack in San 
Bernardino, CA. The attack with the most civilian deaths was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center, followed by the 1995 Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City. The years 2001, 2009, 
and 2015 experienced the most attacks and there were no attacks with civilian deaths between 
2003 and 2006. Figure 1 displays the frequency and the number of fatality across states. Panel A 
of Figure 1 shows that New York and California dominate in terms of the number of attacks. In 
terms of death tolls, Panel B shows that New York, Virginia, and Oklahoma dominate. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the key dependent and independent variables. All 
the continuous variables are winsorized at the extreme top and bottom percentiles. The variable 
MFBias exhibits average optimism in management forecasts but the median shows a slightly 
pessimistic bias. On average, the forecasts included in our sample have a forecast horizon of 154 
days. Of all the firm–quarter observations in our sample, about 1.8% are affected by terrorist 
attacks. 
                                                           






IV. MAIN RESULTS 
4.1 Baseline results 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating Eq. (1). In columns (1) and (2), we regress MFBias 
on the occurrence of terrorist attacks, Attack_Dummy, without and with control variables, 
respectively. Supporting H1, columns (1) and (2) show a negative association between 
Attack_Dummy and MFBias, respectively. For example, in column (2), the coefficient on 
Attack_Dummy is negative and significant (coefficient = -0.096, t = -3.201), suggesting that the 
occurrence of terrorist attacks is associated with a decrease in management forecast bias (or an 
increase in forecast pessimism) of 0.096, representing 8.5% of the standard deviation of forecast 
bias. In columns (3) and (4), we replace Attack_Dummy with Attack_#Death, the logarithm of one 
plus the number of fatalities. Again consistent with H1, the coefficients on Attack_#Death are 
negative and statistically significant. The coefficient in column (4) suggests that, if the number of 
fatalities increases by one from the mean of Attack_#Death, management forecast bias would 
decrease by 0.026. Overall, the results in Table 2 provide evidence that managerial sentiment has 
a significant influence on management forecasts and is robust after controlling for economy-level 
trends and firm-level factors.13 
In columns (5) to (8) of Table 2, we examine what drives the attack-induced negative sentiment 
impact on management forecast bias, whether it is due to a decrease in positive bias, an increase 
in negative bias, or both. To do this, we separate positive and negative forecast bias by constructing 
two variables, MFBias_P and MFBias_N. The variable MFBias_P (MFBias_N) takes the value of 
                                                           
13 We also test the impact of attack severity by restricting our sample to firms located in areas with terrorist attacks 
and regressing management forecast bias on Attack_#Death. We find that higher fatalities lead to significantly more 





MFBias when it is positive (negative) and zero when negative (positive).14 Columns (5) and (6) 
use MFBias_P (i.e., the degree of positive forecast bias) as the dependent variable. The coefficients 
on Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death are both negative and statistically significant, suggesting 
that positive forecast bias is significantly reduced after terrorist attacks. In columns (7) and (8), we 
use MFBias_N (i.e., the degree of negative forecast bias) as the dependent variable and the 
coefficients are again negative in both columns but significant only in column (8). Finally, both 
Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death exhibit higher loadings in columns (5) and (6) compared to 
columns (7) and (8), respectively, suggesting that the effect of terrorist attacks on forecast 
pessimism is driven more by its effect in reducing upward bias than in increasing downward bias.15 
4.2 Cross-sectional results 
Table 3 reports the results of our cross-sectional analyses. Panel A reports the results of the 
moderating effect of operating uncertainty (H2a). Columns (1) and (2) report the results when we 
partition the sample using cash flow volatility and columns (3) and (4) report those using analyst 
forecast dispersion. We find that the negative impact of terrorist attacks is stronger in the subgroup 
of firms operating in a more volatile environment or with higher analyst forecast dispersion, as 
shown by the negative coefficients of Attack_Dummy×F_Chara and Attack_#Death×F_Chara. 
These results suggest that operating and information uncertainty amplify the influence of 
managerial sentiment on management forecast bias. 
                                                           
14 We do not use dummy variables to define positive and negative forecast bias, since positively (negatively) biased 
managers are likely to still remain positively (negatively) biased but the magnitude of the bias is different after terrorist 
attacks.  
15 In untabulated tests, we find that terrorist attacks are associated with more accurate management forecasts. This 
result is consistent with prior literature and our finding in columns (5) to (8) of Table 2. Roger and Stocken (2005) 
show that management forecasts tend to generally overestimate future earnings and we find that the attacks reduce the 
extent of positively biased forecasts and, to a lesser extent, exacerbate negatively biased forecasts. Therefore, attack-
induced pessimistic sentiment neutralizes managerial optimism in earnings forecasting and increases overall forecast 





Panel B of Table 3 presents evidence for the differential effects for firms with older executives, 
executives with longer tenure, and overconfident executives. Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the 
results for the occurrence of terrorist attacks. The coefficients on the interaction 
Attack_Dummy×M_Chara are all positive and significant, except for the executive age test (with 
a t-value 1.645). We attribute this weak result to the lack of power, since Attack_Dummy only 
captures the occurrence of terrorist attacks but not their severity. When we replace 
Attack_Dummy with Attack_#Death in columns (2), (4), and (6), all three interaction items are 
positive and significant, indicating that executives who are older, experienced, or more confident 
are less affected by terrorist attacks, consistent with our expectations. 
Panel C of Table 3 examines the effect of managers’ past exposure to violence on the relation 
between terrorist attacks and management forecasts. We replace Char with the dummy variable 
∆Crime_Rate_D in Eq. (2). In both columns, the coefficients on Attack_Dummy and 
Attack_#Death are negative and significant, confirming that attacks have a significantly negative 
impact on managerial sentiment when local individuals experience relatively less violence in the 
past. The coefficients of the interaction terms between the attack variables and ∆Crime_Rate_D 
are significantly positive, suggesting that emotional reactions to terrorist attacks are desensitized 
when the attacks occur in states with an increasing occurrence of violent crimes. Overall, the cross-
sectional results lend further support for our interpretation that the impact of terrorist attacks on 
management forecast bias is driven by their effects on managerial sentiment. 
4.3 Discussions and robustness checks 
4.3.1 Managerial sentiment versus strategic actions 
Our study uses terrorist attacks to identify the effect of managerial sentiment on forecast bias. 





prior literature suggests that managers often intentionally bias their forecasts to manage market 
expectations. In our setting, managers might not be affected by the negative events and could 
rationally forecast firm performance after terrorist attacks. However, to manage market 
expectations downward, managers can intentionally issue more pessimistic earnings forecasts and 
use terrorist attacks to justify the low expected earnings. Some of our cross-sectional results 
suggest that the impact of terrorist attacks varies with individual attributes (e.g., age, experience, 
and overconfidence), which appears to favor a psychological interpretation. However, executives’ 
age and experience could also be related to their career concerns, although the evidence is largely 
inconclusive (e.g., Stein 1989; Verrecchia 2001). Thus, to further rule out the possibility that 
strategic attribution drives our results, we conduct several additional analyses. 
First, strategic attribution requires that managers cite terrorist attacks in their discussions of 
corporate performance (Knight 2001). In contrast, the sentiment effect is largely unconscious and 
we do not expect to observe more discussions on terrorist attacks. Therefore, to capture the 
strategic attribution behavior, we construct a measure based on the fraction of terror-related words 
in the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of firms’ 10-K/10-Qs filed in each 
quarter.16 To mitigate the effect of boilerplate discussions of terrorist risks, we use the first-
difference form of the measure in our tests. We find that the occurrence of terrorist attacks is not 
associated with but the severity of attacks is positively associated with the increased discussions 
on terrorist attacks, suggesting the existence of strategic attribution behavior.17 Importantly, we 
find that our main results continue to hold after controlling for the measure of strategic attribution 
and the effect of terrorist attacks on management forecast bias does not vary with strategic 
                                                           
16 We define terror-related words as all the variations of the word “terror”, “massive shooting”, and “mass shooting”.  
17 We find, however, that the association between the severity of attacks and strategic attribution becomes insignificant 





attribution (untabulated). These results suggest that strategic attribution is unlikely to be the major 
driver of the effect of terrorist attacks on forecast bias.18 
Second, we conduct an alternative DiD analysis. The treated firms are the same as in our main 
tests (i.e., firms with headquarters close to attacked areas). The control firms are firms with 
headquarters far away from the attacked areas but with some subsidiaries or branches close to the 
attacked areas.19 Arguably, firms with business activities in the attacked areas can use the attacks 
strategically but the managers of these firms are not subject to the sentiment shocks.20 As a result, 
the strategic attribution effect can be largely differenced away in the alternative DiD analysis. 
Table 4 shows that the impact of terrorist attacks on forecast bias continues to hold. 
Third, we examine the relation between terrorist attacks and insider trading behavior. 
According to prior literature (e.g., Frankel, McVay, and Soliman 2011; Brown et al. 2012), 
managerial strategic disclosures are likely associated with insider trading activities. If managers 
intentionally issue pessimistic earnings forecasts to lower market expectations and increase the 
likelihood of beating market expectations in the future, we would expect to observe an increase in 
insider purchases immediately after the issuance of earnings forecasts (Cheng and Lo 2006; Brown 
et al. 2012). On the other hand, if the negatively biased forecasts reflect managers’ true pessimistic 
belief regarding firm performance, the managers should not purchase more shares and could even 
sell their existing shares. 
To investigate insider trading activities around terrorist attacks, we replace the dependent 
variable in Eq. (1) with insider net purchases, Insider_NBuy, which is calculated as the number of 
                                                           
18 In addition, the effect of strategic attribution on management forecast bias is largely insignificant. 
19 The subsidiaries and branches data are obtained from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) database 
(e.g., Li, Lin, and Zhang 2018). We require the control firms to have at least 1% of total sales from the attacked area. 






shares purchased minus the number of shares sold by executives within 30 days of the issuance of 
management forecasts, scaled by total shares outstanding. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show 
that the coefficients on Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death are negative and marginally significant, 
suggesting that managers tend to reduce their shareholdings, albeit marginally, after attacks, 
consistent with the conjecture that attacks induce negative sentiment. In columns (3) and (4), we 
include a dummy variable, MFBias_Neg, and interact it with the attack variables. The variable 
MFBias_Neg takes the value of one if the forecasted earnings are lower than actual earnings and 
zero otherwise. We would expect a positive coefficient on the interaction term if the negative 
forecast bias results from managers’ strategic actions, whereas we expect an insignificant or 
negative coefficient if the biased forecasts reflect managers’ true and pessimistic beliefs regarding 
firm prospects. Consistent with the negative sentiment explanation, we find that managers who 
issue negatively biased forecasts after attacks tend to reduce the holdings of their own firm 
shares.21 
Finally, we conduct some falsification tests to rule out the strategic disclosure interpretation of 
our main findings. Specifically, we examine whether the impact of terrorist attacks on management 
forecasts bias varies with the ex-ante strength of managerial incentives to manage market 
expectations. We use the percentage of stocks and options in CEO total compensation and the 
number of times firms met or beat analyst consensus forecasts in the past 12 quarters, to capture 
managerial incentives. Prior literature suggests that managers with high equity incentives are more 
likely to manage market expectations and reported earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts (e.g., 
Cheng and Warfield 2005). Prior research also suggests that firms that consistently meet or beat 
                                                           
21 Admittedly, managers can also time the disclosure of overdue bad news strategically after the attacks and reduce 
their shareholdings. However, to maximize profits, they should reduce their holdings before rather than after the 
disclosure events (Cheng and Lo 2006). Nonetheless, to the extent that managers’ trading is constrained before the 





analysts’ forecasts are more likely to walk down market expectations (e.g., Kross, Ro, and Suk 
2011). Untabulated results show that the impact of terrorist attacks on management forecasts bias 
does not vary with ex ante incentives to manage market expectations. 
Besides strategic voluntary disclosure, our results could also be driven by managerial 
manipulation of reported earnings. If managers believe that terrorist attacks have an adverse effect 
on firm future performance, they could engage in real or accounting actions to improve the reported 
performance. For example, Antoniou et al. (2017) show that affected managers reduce R&D 
investments after terrorist attacks. The reduction in R&D expenditures tends to increase reported 
earnings in the short term, leading us to observe more negatively biased forecasts relative to 
reported earnings.22 Managers could also engage in accrual management to increase reported 
earnings and restore investor confidence. To make sure that our results are not driven by activities 
to increase reported earnings, we conduct a robustness check by including additional control 
variables such as R&D expenditures and abnormal accruals. Our results are not sensitive to these 
additional controls (untabulated). 
Overall, while it is difficult to completely rule out the strategic action explanation of our main 
results because of the unobservable nature of managers’ true beliefs, the findings of the additional 
analyses, taken together, lend more credence to the managerial sentiment interpretation of our 
results. 
                                                           
22 This argument is only true if managers make the R&D investment decisions after the issuance of forecasts. 






4.3.2 Psychological versus economic effects 
Terrorist attacks can have a direct economic effect on firm performance. For example, the 9/11 
attacks should have had an impact on the performance of airlines or a firm in the hospitality 
industry if the firm had operations in New York City. Therefore, firm managers may revise the 
expected earnings of the firm downward. However, we argue that potential economic effects are 
unlikely to drive our findings, because we focus on forecast bias, which is the difference between 
forecasted and actual earnings. In other words, the potential economic effect of terrorist attacks 
could affect the level of forecasted earnings but not forecast bias, if managers make their forecast 
decisions rationally. In fact, prior literature suggests that the magnitude of the impact of terrorist 
attacks on the economy is small and the direction is unclear (Becker and Rubinstein 2004; 
Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides 2004; Tavares 2004). In untabulated tests, we find no evidence 
that terrorist attacks affect the future sales growth or ROA of our sample firms. This result is 
consistent with those of Antoniou et al. (2017), who find that firm fundamentals do not change 
significantly around and after the occurrence of terrorist attacks. 
To further address the concern of confounding economic effects, we conduct several additional 
robustness tests. First, we exclude the 9/11 attacks from our sample and repeat our main analysis. 
The 9/11 attacks are an extreme case that caused thousands of deaths and serious damage to the 
local economy and even global markets (e.g., Brounen and Derwall 2010). In contrast, the 
influence of terrorist attacks other than those of 9/11 is more likely to be psychological. Columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 6 show that the relation between terrorist attacks and management forecast 
bias remains negative and statistically significant after excluding the 9/11 attacks. Second, we 
exclude attacks targeting any commercial buildings and keep only attacks targeting government 





little economic effect on local firms but could create significant psychological effects. Columns 
(3) and (4) of Table 6 show that our results continue to hold. Last, we exclude firms in the air 
transportation, tourism, hotel and recreation, insurance, and defense industries, whose 
performance is more likely to be affected by terrorist attacks.23 Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 
show that the results are robust.24 Finally, we examine whether the effect of terrorist attacks on 
management forecast bias varies with the proportion of a firm’s foreign sales. If the direct 
economic impact is driving our results, we expect the effect of terrorist attacks to be stronger for 
firms with operations more concentrated locally in the United States. We do not find such an effect 
(untabulated). Overall, the results of our robustness checks are more consistent with the 
psychology-based interpretation than the economic-effect interpretation of our main findings. 
4.3.3 Dynamic effect of terrorist attacks 
To examine whether the treatment and the control firms follow parallel trends absent of 
terrorist attacks and whether the effect of terrorist attacks is indeed short-lived, we next conduct a 
dynamic analysis. Specifically, we modify Eq. (1) by adding the several lead-lag terms to indicate 
different time periods surrounding the occurrence of terrorist attacks. The variable Attack_Dummyn 
(Attack_#Deathn) equals one (the logged value of one plus the number of fatalities) for the affected 
firms for the two-quarter period starting 12 months before the terrorist attack (n = -2), the two-
quarter period starting six months before the terrorist attack (n = -1), and the two-quarter period 
starting six months after the terrorist attack (n = +1), respectively, and zero otherwise. The variable 
Attack_Dummy2+ (Attack_#Death2+) equals one (the logged value of one plus the number of 
fatalities) for affected firms starting one year after the terrorist attack and zero otherwise.25 Table 
                                                           
23 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_effects_arising_from_the_September_11_attacks.  
24 In untabulated tests, we find that our results are not sensitive to the exclusion of any industry from the sample. 
25 For example, if a terrorist attack occurs January 1, 2017, we code the attack variables as follows. For all firms in 





7 presents the results. The lead-lag terms are all insignificant, suggesting that the parallel-trends 
assumption likely holds and the impact of terrorist attacks is short-lived. 
4.3.4 Alternative sampling analysis 
In our main analysis, we employ a broad sample that includes all firms with available data 
throughout the sample period. To further alleviate concerns that the documented results are due to 
potential correlated omitted variables and improve the comparability between affected and control 
firms, we conduct alternative sampling analyses using nearest neighbor matching, coarsened exact 
matching (Iacus, King, and Porro 2011, 2012), and entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012).26 To 
obtain the nearest neighborhood matching sample, we first compute the Euclidean distance 
between treated firms and control candidates based on firm size, the market-to-book ratio, and the 
ROA in the year prior to an attack to control for any differential effects due to the firm’s 
information environment, growth potential, and performance pressure. Each variable is first 
normalized by its standard deviation for comparability. Then we rank control candidates based on 
distance and select (up to) five matched control firms27 in the same industry from non-attacked 
MSAs for each affected firm. We only include the four fiscal quarters before and the four fiscal 
quarters after the attacks in our analysis. To form the coarsened exact matching sample, we match 
firms based on the same set of covariates: firm size, the market-to-book ratio, and the ROA for 
                                                           
Attack_Dummy-1 =1 for the period from July 1 to December 31, 2016, and zero otherwise; Attack_Dummy=1 for the 
period from January 1 to June 30, 2017, and zero otherwise; Attack_Dummy+1 =1 for the period from July 1 to 
December 31, 2017, and zero otherwise; and Attack_Dummy2+ =1 for the period after December 31, 2017, and zero 
otherwise.  
26  Nearest neighbor matching selects one or multiple matching partners that are closest in terms of the key features 
identified by the researchers. This matching technique might discard a large number of observations and lead to 
reduced power. Coarsened exact matching is an application of exact matching and less sensitive to measurement 
error (e.g., Iacus et al., 2012), to the extent that the coarsening is chosen appropriately. Entropy balancing matches 
exactly the specified moments of the covariate distributions (Hainmueller, 2012). This sampling helps to reduce 
model dependence for the subsequent analysis and it does not require that a unit is either matched or discarded by 
imposing certain weight constraints. 





firms in the same industry–year. Then we construct the matched regression sample from four 
quarters before to four quarters after the attack. Finally, to construct entropy-balancing sample, we 
obtain the entropy weights by requiring that the treatment and control groups have the same first 
and second moments (i.e., mean and variance) for the same set of covariates, that is, firm size, the 
market-to-book ratio, and the ROA. Then we repeat the regression using the original sample and 
incorporating the entropy weights. 
We re-estimate Eq. (1) using these alternative samples and report the results in Table 8. The 
coefficients of Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death are significantly negative across all the columns 
and the magnitudes are comparable to those in Table 2, confirming that our findings are robust to 
the different matching and sampling techniques and are unlikely driven by correlated omitted 
variables. 
4.3.5 Managerial sentiment versus investor sentiment 
Hurwitz (2018) finds that managers are susceptible to prevailing market sentiment and their 
earnings forecasts are more pessimistic during low-sentiment periods than during normal-
sentiment periods. One may argue that terrorist attacks can affect management forecast bias 
indirectly through their effects on the market or investor sentiment. However, we argue that this 
effect is unlikely to be substantial in our setting because investors are not necessarily located near 
the attacked areas where the firms’ headquarters are located. Nevertheless, we conduct a 
robustness check by including market or investor sentiment (Michigan Consumer Research Center 
Index) as an additional control variable in our regression (e.g., Hurwitz 2018; Bergman and 
Roychowdhury 2008).28 Our results continue to hold. 
                                                           





V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
5.1 Likelihood of issuing management forecasts 
Our results can suffer from sample selection bias if terrorist attacks affect the likelihood of 
issuing earnings forecasts. In theory, terrorist attacks induce both pessimistic beliefs and higher 
uncertainty about the future. If managers believe the firm will underperform after a terrorist attack, 
they may issue more forecasts to provide timely updates to investors due to litigation risk. In 
contrast, the increase in perceived risk level can discourage voluntary disclosure. In untabulated 
tests, we find no evidence that terrorist attacks affect the likelihood of management forecast 
issuance, suggesting that our results are unlikely driven by selection bias. 
5.2 Other properties of management forecasts 
Prior psychology literature suggests that fear evokes the appraisal of uncertainty in addition to 
pessimistic emotion (e.g., Slovic 1987). Prior studies suggest that, as the level of uncertainty 
increases, managers tend to shorten forecast horizons and widen forecast ranges (e.g., Cheng, Luo, 
and Yue 2013). Thus, we expect that firms affected by terrorist attacks issue earnings guidance 
with shorter forecast horizons and wider ranges (i.e., less precise forecasts). To test this prediction, 
we replace the dependent variable in Eq. (1) with measures of forecast horizon and forecast range 
and report the results in Table 9. The results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that, on average, the 
forecast horizon is shortened by 16 days if a terrorist attack occurs and by five days if the number 
of deaths increases by one. Columns (3) and (4) report the results for the forecast range. Although 
the coefficient on Attack_Dummy is not significant, the coefficient on Attack_#Death is positive 






5.3 Tone of firm mandatory filings 
In this section, we explore the role of managerial sentiment in the context of firm mandatory 
disclosure. Specifically, we examine how managerial sentiment affects the tone of firms’ 10-K/10-
Q filings. Firms’ 10-K/10-Q filings contain both historical and forward-looking information on 
firm performance, especially in the MD&A section (Li 2010). Managers are responsible for the 
presentation and integrity of firm filings and their subjective beliefs inevitably affect the final 
output of the forward-looking statements in corporate filings (e.g., Huang, Teoh, and Zhang 2014). 
We argue that the tone of firms’ 10-K/10-Q filings is likely subjective and prone to cognitive bias. 
Thus, we expect that a negative shock to managerial sentiment should lead to more pessimistic 
tone of firm filings. Consistent with our main analysis, we focus on 10-Ks and 10-Qs filed during 
the two-quarter periods after the attacks. 
We construct the tone measure of firms’ 10-K/10-Q filings as the difference between unique 
negative and unique positive words divided by the sum of negative and positive words 
(Nega_Posi).29 The variable Nega_Posi serves as a summary measure to capture the overall tone 
of the firm filing. Following Huang et al. (2014), we control for the following firm characteristics 
in the regression: firm size (Size), the market-to-book ratio (MTB), ROA, the change in ROA 
(∆ROA), monthly return volatility (SD_MRet), ROA volatility (SD_ROA), firm age (Firm_Age), 
logged number of business segments (Log(#BUSSEG)), logged number of geographic segments 
(Log(#GEOSEG)), negative earnings (Loss), analyst forecast error (AFE), and the analyst 
consensus forecast (AF). Table 10 shows that the overall firm filing tone becomes more negative 
after terrorist attacks, consistent with our expectations. The coefficients indicate that the net 
                                                           
29 We obtained the counts of positive and negative words for firm 10-K/10-Q filings from Professor Bill McDonald’s 





fraction of negative words increases by 0.7% after attacks and 0.2% if the fatality increases by one 
from the mean. Overall, these results suggest that managerial sentiment has an influence beyond 
the regime of voluntary disclosure. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Using both the occurrence of terrorist attacks and the number of deaths during the attacks as 
exogenous shocks to managerial sentiment, we find that firms located within the same MSA as 
terrorist attacks issue more pessimistic forecasts within the two quarters after the attacks and the 
forecasts are more pessimistic as the death toll of the attacks increases. Moreover, we find that the 
effects of managerial sentiment are more pronounced for firms with higher operating uncertainty, 
younger executives and less experienced executives. On the other hand, the effects of managerial 
sentiment are weakened for firms with overconfident executives and for attacks happen in an area 
where there has been an increase in violent events. Finally, we find that managerial sentiment also 
influences management forecast horizon and the tone in firm 10-K/10-Q filings. Our study 
contributes to the literature by identifying the role of managerial sentiment in corporate reporting 
and disclosure. Our findings can help market participants to better interpret the information 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Dependent variables  
MFBias 
 
Management forecast bias, computed as the difference between the 
management forecast, using point estimates or the mid-point of range 
estimates, and actual earnings per share, deflated by the quarter-end stock 
price and averaged over each quarter, multiplied by 100. 
MFBias_P Measure of positive forecast bias, defined as the value of MFBias if positive 
and zero otherwise. 
MFBias_N Measure of negative forecast bias, defined as the value of MFBias if negative 
and zero otherwise. 
Log(Horizon) Natural logarithm of the average horizon of all forecasts made by a firm in a 
quarter. For each forecast, the horizon is the number of calendar days 
between the forecast announcement date and the forecast period end date. 
Range Average range for all forecasts made by a firm in a quarter. For each forecast, 
the range is calculated as the difference between the upper and lower ends, 
divided by the quarter-end stock price and it is zero for the point estimate. 
Nega_Posi Difference between unique negative and unique positive words divided by 
the sum of negative and positive words in firm 10-K/10-Q filings issued in 
the quarter. 
Insider_NBuy Number of shares purchased minus the number sold by executives within 30 
days after the issuance of management forecasts, divided by total shares 
outstanding. 
Attack variables  
Attack_Dummy 
 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms located in the same 
MSA as the attack for the two fiscal quarters after the attacks, i.e., the quarters 
with a quarter-end falling in the first six months following the terrorist attack 
and zero otherwise. 
Attack_#Death Natural logarithm of one plus the number of civilian deaths in a terrorist 
attack for firms located in the same MSA as the attack for the two fiscal 
quarters after the occurrence of the attacks, i.e., quarters with a quarter-end 
falling in the first six months following a terrorist attack and zero otherwise. 
Control variables  
Size Natural logarithm of market value of equity, calculated as the stock price at 
the quarter-end multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. 
MTB Market value of assets divided by firm book assets. 
Leverage Long-term debt divided by the market value of assets. 
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 





AnalystCov The natural logarithm of one plus the number of unique analysts covering the 
firm in the year. 
SD_Ret Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the current quarter. 
SD_ROA Standard deviation of the ROA over the last five years. 
Firm_Age Logged value of one plus the number of years since the firm was first covered 
by the CRSP. 
Log(#BUSSEG) Logged value of the number of business segments or zero if the item is 
missing from Compustat. 
Log(#GEOSEG) Logged value of the number of geographic segments or zero if the item is 
missing from Compustat. 
SD_MRet Standard deviation of monthly returns over the year. 
Loss Dummy variable that is set to one when the ROA is negative and zero 
otherwise. 
AFE Analyst forecast error, calculated as IBES earnings per share minus the 
median of the most recent analysts’ forecasts, deflated by the quarter-end 
stock price. 
AF Analyst consensus forecast for one-year-ahead earnings per share, scaled by 
the quarter-end stock price. 
Cross-sectional variables  
SD_CF_D Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s standard deviation of 
cash flow (deflated by assets) over the last five years (SD_CF) is in the 
highest tercile and zero otherwise. 
AF_Dispersion_D Dummy variable that takes the value of one if analyst forecast dispersion over 
the last 12 months (AF_Dispersion) is in the highest tercile and zero 
otherwise. 
Age_D Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the average of CEO’s age and 
CFO’s age (Age) is in the highest tercile and zero otherwise. 
Tenure_D Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the average of CEO’s and 
CFO’s numbers of years in office (Tenure) is in the highest tercile and zero 
otherwise. 
Overconfidence Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO/CFO is a long holder 
of stock options and zero otherwise. A CEO/CFO is considered a long holder 
if the CEO/CFO ever holds a stock option that is at least 40% in the money 
at least until the last year. 
∆Crime_Rate_D Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the average annual change in 








Appendix B. List of Terrorist Attacks 
This table lists all terrorist attacks used in the study. Death refers to the total number of civilian deaths (excluding the 
deaths of terrorists). 
Attack Date City State Death 
Federal Building 04/19/1995 Oklahoma OK 168 
Sacramento 04/24/1995 Sacramento CA     1 
Armtrack  10/09/1995 Hyder AZ     1 
Olympic Games 07/27/1996 Atlanta GA     1 
Empire State Building 02/23/1997 New York NY     1 
Abortion Clinic Bombing 01/29/1998 Birmingham AL     1 
U.S. Capitol 07/24/1998 Washington DC     2 
Columbine High School 04/20/1999 Littleton CO   13 
9/11: World Trade Center 09/11/2001 New York NY     2,755 
9/11: Hijacked Plane Crash 09/11/2001 Arlington VA 184 
9/11: Hijacked Plane Crash 09/11/2001 Somerset County PA   40 
America Media Inc. 10/02/2001 Boca Raton FL     1 
Anthrax Attack 11/14/2001 Oxford CT     1 
LA International Airport 07/04/2002 Los Angeles CA     2 
Virginia Tech 04/16/2007 Blacksburg VA   32 
Knoxville Church 07/27/2008 Knoxville TN     2 
Immigration Center 04/03/2009 Binghamton NY   13 
Raul Flores Family 05/30/2009 Arivaca AZ     2 
Military Recruiting Station 06/01/2009 Little Rock AR     1 
Holocaust Museum 06/10/2009 Washington DC     1 
Fort Hood 11/05/2009 Killeen TX   13 
IRS Building 02/18/2010 Austin TX     1 
Century 16 Movie Theatre 07/20/2012 Aurora CO   12 
Sikh Temple 08/05/2012 Oak Creek WI   6 
Sandy Hook Elementary School 12/14/2012 Sandy Hook CT   26 
Boston Marathon 04/15/2013 Boston MA    3 
Navy Yard 09/16/2013 Washington DC 12 
LA International Airport 11/01/2013 Los Angeles CA 1 
Jewish Retirement Home 04/13/2014 Overland Park KS 3 
LV Restaurant and Walmart 06/08/2014 Las Vegas NV 3 
Blooming Grove Barracks 09/12/2014 Blooming Grove PA 1 
Police Vehicle 12/20/2014 New York NY 2 
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church 06/17/2015 Charleston SC 9 
Navy Operational Support Center 07/16/2015 Chattanooga TN 5 
Johnston Street 07/23/2015 Lafayette LA 2 
Planned Parenthood Clinic 11/27/2015 Colorado Springs CO 3 






Figure 1. Geographic Dispersion of Terrorist Attacks  
Panel A: The Frequency of Terrorist Attacks by States 
 







Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the regression sample from 1995 to 2015. Detailed variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix A. 
 Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
MFBias 0.096 1.133 -0.277 -0.066 0.151 
Horizon 154.010 102.413 66.000 147.000 229.500 
Range 0.298 0.330 0.092 0.202 0.386 
Nega_Posi 0.415 0.176 0.316 0.437 0.535 
Attack_Dummy 0.018 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Attack_#Death 0.041 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Size 7.428 1.503 6.346 7.323 8.437 
MTB 1.998 1.141 1.240 1.640 2.338 
Leverage 0.117 0.119 0.007 0.086 0.186 
ROA 0.013 0.020 0.005 0.013 0.023 
InstHold 0.745 0.204 0.630 0.791 0.900 
AnalystCov 2.460 0.653 2.079 2.485 2.944 
SD_Ret 0.024 0.013 0.015 0.021 0.030 
∆ROA -0.001 0.018 -0.005 0.000 0.004 
SD_ROA 0.016 0.020 0.006 0.010 0.019 
SD_RetM 0.107 0.057 0.067 0.093 0.131 
Firm_Age 2.738 0.908 2.197 2.773 3.466 
Log(#BUSSEG) 0.714 0.748 0.000 0.693 1.386 
Log(#GEOSEG) 0.829 0.739 0.000 0.693 1.386 
Loss 0.120 0.325 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AFE 0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.001 0.002 
AF 0.054 0.038 0.038 0.053 0.070 
SD_CF 0.029 0.025 0.014 0.022 0.035 
AF_Dispersion 0.119 0.156 0.037 0.069 0.138 
Age 54.257 6.315 50.000 54.000 58.000 
Tenure 7.032 6.795 2.000 5.000 10.000 






Table 2. Terrorist Attacks and Management Forecast Bias 
This table presents the estimation results for the effects of managerial sentiment on management forecast bias. The dependent variable, MFBias, is the difference 
between the management forecast and actual earnings per share, deflated by the quarter-end stock price and averaged over each quarter, multiplied by 100. The 
variable MFBias_P (MFBias_N) measures positive (negative) management forecast bias and Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death capture the occurrence and the 
death tolls of terrorist attacks, respectively. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. Each regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each 
year. MSA-clustered heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Predicted Sign MFBias MFBias MFBias_P MFBias_N 
Attack_Dummy - -0.092*** -0.096***   -0.083***  -0.013  
  (-3.042) (-3.201)   (-3.985)  (-0.901)  
          
Attack_#Death -   -0.037*** -0.037***  -0.034***  -0.004** 
    (-6.816) (-5.850)  (-5.112)  (-2.151) 
          
Size   -0.014  -0.014 -0.152*** -0.152*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 
   (-0.490)  (-0.490) (-6.698) (-6.688) (11.187) (11.177) 
          
MTB   -0.004  -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 0.003 0.003 
   (-0.421)  (-0.415) (-0.884) (-0.878) (0.711) (0.713) 
          
Leverage   0.733***  0.730*** 0.702*** 0.699*** 0.031 0.031 
   (3.986)  (3.940) (4.883) (4.831) (0.472) (0.464) 
          
ROA   -7.925***  -7.928*** -5.856*** -5.858*** -2.070*** -2.070*** 
   (-13.244)  (-13.229) (-11.989) (-11.978) (-10.984) (-10.983) 
          
InstHold   0.484***  0.485*** 0.268*** 0.269*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 
   (4.907)  (4.900) (3.403) (3.401) (5.952) (5.953) 
          
AnalystCov   0.290***  0.291*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
   (9.489)  (9.491) (8.166) (8.173) (6.301) (6.301) 
          
SD_Ret   3.250***  3.228*** 4.327*** 4.306*** -1.077*** -1.079*** 
   (3.087)  (3.074) (4.901) (4.902) (-3.192) (-3.193) 
          
Constant  0.307*** -0.774*** 0.307*** -0.774*** 0.850*** 0.850*** -1.624*** -1.624*** 
  (3.336) (-3.126) (3.342) (-3.127) (4.356) (4.354) (-16.974) (-16.961) 





Firm Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  45,944 45,944 45,944 45,944 45,944 45,944 45,944 45,944 





Table 3. Terrorist Attacks and Management Forecast Bias: Cross-Sectional Tests 
This table presents the cross-sectional results for the effects of managerial sentiment on management forecast bias. 
The dependent variable, MFBias, is the difference between the management forecast and actual earnings per share, 
deflated by the quarter-end stock price and averaged over each quarter, multiplied by 100. The variables 
Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death capture the occurrence and the death tolls of terrorist attacks, respectively. In Panel 
A, F_Chara is a dummy variable to measure firm cash flow volatility (SD_CF_D) or analyst forecast dispersion 
(AF_Dispersion_D). It equals one for the highest tercile and zero otherwise. In Panel B, M_Chara is a dummy variable 
for managerial characteristics, including the average age of CEOs and CFOs (Age), the average tenure of CEOs and 
CFOs (Tenure), and degree of overconfidence (Overconfidence). The variables Age_D and Tenure_D equal one for 
the highest tercile and zero otherwise and Overconfidence equals one if either CEO or CFO is classified as a long 
holder of stock options and zero otherwise. In Panel C, the variable ∆Crime_Rate_D is a dummy variable for changes 
in the state crime rates over the last five years. It equals one for the highest tercile and zero otherwise. All other 
variables are as defined in Appendix A. Each regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each year. MSA-
clustered heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
 Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
F_Chara  SD_CF_D AF_Dispersion_D 
Attack_Dummy - -0.016  0.004  
  (-0.821)  (0.285)  
      
Attack_Dummy× F_Chara - -0.234***  -0.258***  
  (-3.090)  (-5.004)  
      
Attack_#Death -  -0.006  -0.021*** 
   (-1.144)  (-5.085) 
      
Attack_#Death× F_Chara -  -0.052***  -0.038*** 
   (-2.969)  (-4.309) 
      
F_Chara  0.041 0.040 0.147*** 0.144*** 
  (1.139) (1.103) (6.949) (6.832) 
      
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  41,749 41,749 45,714 45,714 







Panel B: Manager Characteristics 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
M_Chara  Age_D Tenure_D Overconfidence 
Attack_Dummy - -0.085*  -0.133***  -0.084  
  (-1.810)  (-3.072)  (-1.633)  
        
Attack_Dummy×M_Chara + 0.088  0.168*  0.178*  
  (1.645)  (1.929)  (1.692)  
        
Attack_#Death -  -0.031***  -0.031***  -0.043*** 
   (-4.201)  (-2.609)  (-2.707) 
        
Attack_#Death×M_Chara +  0.023**  0.081***  0.121*** 
   (2.332)  (3.544)  (3.213) 
        
M_Chara  0.036 0.036 0.058 0.059 -0.025 -0.025 
  (1.599) (1.622) (1.195) (1.204) (-0.303) (-0.300) 
        
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  39,845 39,845 18,985 18,985 15,938 15,938 
Adjusted R2  0.204 0.204 0.246 0.246 0.251 0.251 
 
Panel C: Changes in State Crime Rates 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) 
Dependent  MFBias 
Attack_Dummy - -0.112***  
  (-2.966)  
    
Attack_Dummy×∆Crime_Rate_D + 0.270***  
  (3.694)  
    
Attack_#Death -  -0.038*** 
   (-4.790) 
    
Attack_#Death×∆Crime_Rate_D +  0.092*** 
   (6.527) 
    
∆Crime_Rate_D  -0.017 -0.016 
  (-0.462) (-0.451) 
    
Control Variables   Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes 
Observations  42,235 42,235 






Table 4. Terrorist Attacks and Management Forecast Bias: Alternative Difference-in-Differences Design 
This table presents the estimation results for the effects of managerial sentiment on management forecast bias, 
controlling for the possible strategic action effect. We pool the firms located in the same metropolitan statistical area 
as a terrorist attack (treatment sample) with firms having at least 1% of sales from the same state as a terrorist attack 
(control sample). The dependent variable, MFBias, is the difference between the management forecast and actual 
earnings per share, deflated by the quarter-end stock price and averaged over each quarter, multiplied by 100. 
Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death capture the occurrence and the death tolls of terrorist attacks, respectively. All 
other variables are as defined in Appendix A. Each regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each year. 
MSA-clustered heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) 
Dependent  MFBias MFBias 
Attack_Dummy - -0.102***  
  (-3.416)  
    
Attack_#Death -  -0.039*** 
   (-5.621) 
    
Size  -0.029 -0.029 
  (-0.918) (-0.914) 
    
MTB  -0.005 -0.005 
  (-0.416) (-0.414) 
    
Leverage  0.719*** 0.715*** 
  (3.528) (3.474) 
    
ROA  -7.937*** -7.940*** 
  (-10.643) (-10.637) 
    
InstHold  0.474*** 0.475*** 
  (3.973) (3.973) 
    
AnalystCov  0.293*** 0.293*** 
  (8.706) (8.717) 
    
SD_Ret  3.401*** 3.367*** 
  (2.762) (2.747) 
    
Constant  -0.656** -0.657** 
  (-2.280) (-2.278) 
    
Firm Fixed  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes 
Observations  31,949 31,949 







Table 5. Terrorist Attacks, Management Forecast Bias, and Insider Trading 
This table presents the results for the effects of managerial sentiment on insider trading. The dependent variable, 
Insider_NBuy, is the number of shares purchased minus those sold by executives within 30 days after management 
forecasts, divided by total shares outstanding. The variables Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death capture the occurrence 
and the death tolls of terrorist attacks, respectively. The variable MFBias_Neg is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the forecasted earnings is lower than actual earnings and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. Each regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each year. MSA-clustered 
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent  Insider_NBuy Insider_NBuy Insider_NBuy Insider_NBuy 
Attack_Dummy ? -0.059  0.030  
  (-1.628)  (1.190)  
      
Attack_ Dummy* MFBias_Neg -   -0.125*  
    (-1.813)  
      
Attack_#Death ?  -0.015*  0.011*** 
   (-1.834)  (2.969) 
      
Attack_#Death* MFBias_Neg -    -0.040*** 
     (-3.441) 
      
MFBias_Neg - -0.056* -0.056* -0.038** -0.038** 
  (-1.807) (-1.805) (-2.306) (-2.251) 
      
Size  -0.056* -0.056* -0.059* -0.059* 
  (-1.807) (-1.805) (-1.922) (-1.919) 
      
MTB  -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.099*** -0.099*** 
  (-4.797) (-4.780) (-4.822) (-4.812) 
      
ROA  -3.279*** -3.282*** -3.243*** -3.249*** 
  (-5.618) (-5.633) (-5.591) (-5.617) 
      
Ret  -3.098*** -3.099*** -3.067*** -3.067*** 
  (-20.042) (-20.086) (-20.336) (-20.384) 
      
SD_Ret  0.256 0.251 0.251 0.254 
  (0.274) (0.268) (0.270) (0.273) 
      
Constant  1.876*** 1.870*** 1.905*** 1.901*** 
  (6.788) (6.805) (6.980) (6.988) 
      
Firm Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  51,263 51,263 51,263 51,263 







Table 6. Terrorist Attacks and Management Forecast Bias: Robustness Checks 
This table presents the estimation results for the effects of managerial sentiment on management forecast bias, using 
different restricted samples. The dependent variable, MFBias, is the difference between the management forecast and 
actual earnings per share, deflated by the quarter-end stock price and averaged over each quarter, multiplied by 100. 
The variables Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death capture the occurrence and the death tolls of terrorist attacks, 
respectively. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. Columns (1) and (2) exclude the second half of 2001; 
columns (3) and (4) exclude all commercial targets; and columns (5) and (6) exclude all firms in the air transportation, 
tourism, hotel and recreation, insurance, and defense industries. Each regression contains a dummy variable for each 
firm and each year. MSA-clustered heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





Dependent   MFBias MFBias MFBias MFBias MFBias MFBias 
Attack_Dummy - -0.067**  -0.098***  -0.090**  
  (-1.973)  (-2.961)  (-2.428)  
        
Attack_#Death -  -0.065**  -0.064***  -0.044*** 
   (-2.266)  (-3.082)  (-7.324) 
        
Size  -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 
  (-0.395) (-0.397) (-0.433) (-0.433) (-0.293) (-0.295) 
        
MTB  -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 
  (-0.118) (-0.114) (-0.446) (-0.442) (-0.961) (-0.950) 
        
Leverage  0.725*** 0.725*** 0.744*** 0.744*** 0.741*** 0.738*** 
  (4.130) (4.127) (4.066) (4.065) (4.083) (4.033) 
        
ROA  -8.246*** -8.244*** -7.955*** -7.958*** -7.793*** -7.794*** 
  (-13.598) (-13.572) (-13.351) (-13.348) (-13.101) (-13.081) 
        
InstHold  0.498*** 0.498*** 0.483*** 0.483*** 0.493*** 0.494*** 
  (4.867) (4.864) (4.849) (4.852) (4.700) (4.687) 
        
AnalystCov  0.288*** 0.288*** 0.290*** 0.290*** 0.294*** 0.294*** 
  (9.397) (9.412) (9.492) (9.498) (9.404) (9.401) 
        
SD_Ret  3.326*** 3.312*** 3.232*** 3.229*** 3.409*** 3.380*** 
  (3.037) (3.031) (3.064) (3.057) (3.094) (3.079) 
        
Constant  -0.801*** -0.800*** -0.787*** -0.787*** -0.821*** -0.821*** 
  (-3.216) (-3.215) (-3.274) (-3.269) (-3.195) (-3.201) 
        
Firm Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  44,811 44,811 45,676 45,676 44,263 44,263 






Table 7. Terrorist Attacks and Management Forecast Bias: Dynamic Regressions 
This table presents the results of dynamic estimation for the effects of managerial sentiment on management forecast 
bias. The dependent variable, MFBias, is the difference between the management forecast and actual earnings per 
share, deflated by the quarter-end stock price and averaged over each quarter, multiplied by 100. The variables 
Attack_Dummy-2 (Attack_#Death-2), Attack_Dummy-1 (Attack_#Death-1), Attack_Dummy+1 (Attack_#Death+1), and 
Attack_Dummy2+ (Attack_#Death2+) indicate different time periods surrounding the occurrence of terrorist attacks. 
The variables Attack_Dummy-2 (Attack_#Death-2), Attack_Dummy-1 (Attack_#Death-1), and Attack_Dummy+1 
(Attack_#Death+1) equal one (the logged value of one plus the number of fatalities) for the affected firms for the two-
quarter period starting 12 months before the terrorist attack, the two-quarter period starting six months before the 
terrorist attack, and the two-quarter period starting six months after the terrorist attack, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
The variable Attack_Dummy2+ (Attack_#Death2+) equals one (the logged value of one plus the number of fatalities) 
for affected firms starting one year after the terrorist attacks and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. Each regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each year. MSA-clustered 
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) 
Dependent   MFBias MFBias 
Attack_Dummy-2 Insignificant -0.054  
  (-1.130)  
    
Attack_Dummy-1 Insignificant -0.042  
  (-0.802)  
    
Attack_Dummy - -0.108***  
  (-3.162)  
    
Attack_Dummy+1 Insignificant 0.013  
  (0.299)  
    
Attack_Dummy2+ Insignificant -0.016  
  (-0.453)  
    
Attack_#Death-2 Insignificant  -0.039 
   (-1.564) 
    
Attack_#Death-1 Insignificant  -0.009 
   (-0.270) 
    
Attack_#Death -  -0.038*** 
   (-6.147) 
    
Attack_#Death+1 Insignificant  0.007 
   (0.654) 
    
Attack_#Death2+ Insignificant  -0.001 
   (-0.206) 
    
Size  -0.014 -0.014 
  (-0.492) (-0.497) 
    
MTB  -0.005 -0.004 
  (-0.431) (-0.419) 
    





  (3.981) (3.952) 
    
ROA  -7.916*** -7.920*** 
  (-13.162) (-13.173) 
    
InstHold  0.486*** 0.486*** 
  (4.895) (4.893) 
    
AnalystCov  0.290*** 0.291*** 
  (9.496) (9.509) 
    
SD_Ret  3.262*** 3.238*** 
  (3.093) (3.084) 
    
Constant  -0.771*** -0.774*** 
  (-3.151) (-3.143) 
    
Firm Fixed  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes 
Observations  45,944 45,944 






Table 8. Terrorist Attacks and Management Forecasts Bias: Alternative Samples 
This table presents the estimation results for the effects of managerial sentiment on management forecast bias using 
alternative samples. Columns (1) and (2) use the nearest neighborhood matched sample. For each affected firm, we 
select (up to) five matched control firms from non-attacked MSAs in the year prior to an attack, based on industry, 
firm size, the market-to-book ratio, and the ROA. We keep the four fiscal quarters before and the four fiscal quarters 
after the attacks in the regression. Columns (3) and (4) use a coarsened exact matched sample based on industry, firm 
size, the market-to-book ratio, and the ROA and provide the estimates for the period four quarters before to four 
quarters after the attacks. Columns (5) and (6) use entropy balancing on the original sample. The dependent variable, 
MFBias, is the difference between the management forecast and actual earnings per share, deflated by the quarter-end 
stock price and averaged over each quarter, multiplied by 100. The variables Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death 
capture the occurrence and the death tolls of terrorist attacks, respectively. All other variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. Each regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each year. MSA-clustered 
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






Attack_Dummy - -0.091*  -0.082*  -0.094***  
  (-1.709)  (-1.691)  (-3.692)  
        
Attack_#Death -  -0.057***  -0.053***  -0.038*** 
   (-3.739)  (-3.737)  (-6.181) 
        
Size  0.067 0.065 -0.021 -0.023 0.012 0.012 
  (1.044) (1.004) (-0.368) (-0.391) (0.374) (0.375) 
        
MTB  -0.053* -0.052 -0.011 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 
  (-1.678) (-1.647) (-0.375) (-0.379) (-1.472) (-1.473) 
        
Leverage  0.447 0.434 0.585 0.573 0.511** 0.505** 
  (1.101) (1.065) (1.457) (1.420) (2.375) (2.319) 
        
ROA  -5.573*** -5.596*** -5.706*** -5.720*** -7.545*** -7.550*** 
  (-4.804) (-4.816) (-5.624) (-5.619) (-8.559) (-8.554) 
        
InstHold  0.010 0.016 0.230 0.236 0.487*** 0.488*** 
  (0.041) (0.064) (1.160) (1.189) (5.923) (5.943) 
        
AnalystCov  0.292*** 0.290*** 0.252*** 0.249*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 
  (3.982) (3.943) (4.211) (4.170) (7.674) (7.685) 
        
SD_Ret  1.046 1.028 1.552 1.520 4.810*** 4.757*** 
  (0.591) (0.583) (1.041) (1.028) (4.054) (4.017) 
        
Constant  -0.853* -0.832* -0.236 -0.220 -0.986*** -0.988*** 
  (-1.794) (-1.716) (-0.549) (-0.504) (-2.971) (-2.974) 
        
Firm Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  17,460 17,460 13,861 13,861 45,944 45,944 







Table 9. Terrorist Attacks and Management Forecasts: Other Forecast Properties 
This table presents the estimation results for the effects of managerial sentiment on management forecast horizon and 
forecast range. The dependent variables are the forecast horizon (Log(Horizon)) and the forecast range (Range). The 
variables Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death capture the occurrence and the death tolls of terrorist attacks, respectively. 
All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. Each regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each 
year. MSA-clustered heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) Predicted Sign (3) (4) 
Dependent  Log(Horizon)  Range 
Attack_Dummy - -0.107***  + 0.001  
  (-3.450)   (0.090)  
       
Attack_#Death -  -0.043*** +  0.002* 
   (-7.293)   (1.958) 
       
Size  -0.034** -0.034**  -0.197*** -0.197*** 
  (-2.292) (-2.289)  (-20.365) (-20.366) 
       
MTB  0.061*** 0.061***  -0.005 -0.005 
  (8.915) (8.910)  (-1.079) (-1.080) 
       
Leverage  -0.158** -0.162**  0.331*** 0.331*** 
  (-2.309) (-2.370)  (6.847) (6.853) 
       
ROA  0.388 0.385  -0.756*** -0.756*** 
  (1.010) (1.005)  (-7.474) (-7.469) 
       
InstHold  -0.077 -0.075  0.031 0.031 
  (-1.596) (-1.556)  (0.975) (0.973) 
       
AnalystCov  -0.048*** -0.048***  0.041*** 0.041*** 
  (-2.673) (-2.656)  (4.530) (4.525) 
       
SD_Ret  -4.476*** -4.503***  2.284*** 2.287*** 
  (-7.285) (-7.354)  (9.311) (9.291) 
       
Constant  5.591*** 5.591***  1.727*** 1.727*** 
  (38.114) (38.101)  (25.313) (25.312) 
       
Firm Fixed  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  45,089 45,089  45,847 45,847 







Table 10. Terrorist Attacks and Disclosure Tone 
This table presents the estimation results for the effects of managerial sentiment on financial reporting disclosure tone. 
The dependent variable is the difference between negative and positive words divided by the sum of negative and 
positive words (Nega_Posi) in firm 10-K/10-Q reports. The variables Attack_Dummy and Attack_#Death capture the 
occurrence and the death tolls of terrorist attacks, respectively. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. Each 
regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each year. MSA-clustered heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) 
Dependent  Nega_Posi Nega_Posi 
Attack_Dummy + 0.007**  
  (1.983)  
    
Attack_#Death +  0.003*** 
   (3.875) 
    
Size  -0.010** -0.010** 
  (-2.044) (-2.044) 
    
MTB  -0.015*** -0.015*** 
  (-5.688) (-5.688) 
    
ROA  -0.113 -0.112 
  (-0.983) (-0.979) 
    
∆ROA  -0.027 -0.027 
  (-0.423) (-0.424) 
    
SD_MRet  0.293*** 0.292*** 
  (2.968) (2.967) 
    
SD_ROA  0.086*** 0.087*** 
  (3.303) (3.304) 
    
Firm_Age  0.019 0.019 
  (1.331) (1.341) 
    
Log(#BUSSEG)  -0.003 -0.003 
  (-0.681) (-0.679) 
    
Log(#GEOSEG)  -0.002 -0.002 
  (-0.366) (-0.361) 
    
Loss  0.012*** 0.012*** 
  (2.988) (2.997) 
    
AFE  -0.179 -0.179 
  (-0.745) (-0.745) 
    
AF  -0.144*** -0.144*** 
  (-2.976) (-2.968) 
    
Constant  0.465*** 0.465*** 





    
Firm Fixed  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes 
Observations  35,323 35,323 
Adjusted R2  0.404 0.404 
 
